Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County and
The Utah State Tax Commission of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Yocum; Salt Lake County Attorney; Karl Hendrickson; Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney;
Bill Thomas Peters; Special Deputy County Attorney; Paul Van Dam; Utah State Attorney General;
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General.
James B. Lee; Kent W. Winterholler; Parsons, Behle and Latimer; Attorneys for Kennecott Corp..
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County and The Utah State Tax Commission of Utah, No. 920149.00 (Utah
Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4099

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 92-0149
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY and THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Priority 15

Defendants/Appellants.
* * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE RIGTRUP
DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1992

DAVID E. YOCOM - 3 851
Salt Lake County Attorney
KARL HENDRICKSON - 14 64
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS - 2574
Special Deputy County Attorney
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Salt Lake County

JAMES B. LEE (1919)
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER (3525)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main St., #1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Attorneys for Kennecott Corp.

PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Utah State Attorney General
JOSEPH T. DUNBECK, JR. - 3 645
Assistant Attorney General
3 6 South State Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Tax Commission
* * * * * * * *

FILED
OCF 1 9 1992
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 92-0149
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY and THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Priority 15

Defendants/Appellants.
* * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE RIGTRUP
DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1992

DAVID E. YOCOM - 3851
Salt Lake County Attorney
KARL HENDRICKSON - 14 64
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS - 2574
Special Deputy County Attorney
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Salt Lake County

JAMES B. LEE (1919)
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER (3525)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main St., #1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Attorneys for Kennecott Corp.

PAUL VAN DAM - 3 312
Utah State Attorney General
JOSEPH T. DUNBECK, JR. - 3 64 5
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Tax Commission
* * * * * * * *

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

A.

Nature of the Case

4

B.

Course of Proceedings Below

5

C.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues
Presented

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

POINT I --

JUDGE RIGTRUP WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING
KENNECOTT WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM
THE APPLICATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE AS TO KENNECOTT'S JANUARY 1,
1983 ASSESSMENT

12

POINT II -- DENIAL OF RELIEF TO KENNECOTT RESPECTING TO ITS JANUARY 1, 1983 ASSESSMENT
WILL VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS

21

CONCLUSION

33

ADDENDUM
A.
B.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A-l

VERBATIM PRESENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

B-1

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited

Page

Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission. 488 U.S. 336, 109 S. Ct. 633,
102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989)
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Commission. 796
P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990)

31
32

Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias. 468 U.S. 263,
104 S. Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984)

...18, 19, 23

Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d
634 (Utah 1989)

32

Carter v. Beaver County Service Area. 16 Utah
2d 280, 283, 399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965)

20, n.7

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.
Inc. . 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87
L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)

30

Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission. 110
Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946)

25, 26

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d
481 (1991)
16, 17, 18, 19, 30, 31
Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County.
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 92-0286..

5, 8, 28, n.10

McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco. 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.
Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990)
22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28
Plvler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382,
72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)

31

Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. Salt
Lake Suburban Sanitary District, 738
P.2d 635 (Utah 1987)

22, n.8

Rio Algom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County.
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)
1, 6-14, 19, 20, 27, 28, 31, 32

(i)

Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash, 2d 34,
830 P. 2d 318 (1992)
Sharf
Smith

v. BMG
1985)

Corp..

700

P.2d

1068

19 , n.6

(Utah
1

v. Travis County Education District,
791 F. Supp. 1170
(D. Tex. 1992) ,
vacated on other grounds, 968 F.2d 453
(5th Cir. 1992)

Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 214,
129 P. 2d 881 (1942)
Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Industrial
CommTn, 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982)

28, 29
30
29

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Fourteenth

Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution

2, 12, 23, 30, 32, 33

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7

2, 12, 30, 33

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24
Utah Constitution, Article XIII,
Section 2
Utah Constitution, Article XIII,
Section 3

1, 6, 8, 9, 12, 20, 30, 33
2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 20, 30, 33

Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 4
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1981)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109

2, 12, 30, 32, 33

9, 12
.3

1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 19, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 (Supp. 1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 (Supp. 1983)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-1 et seq. (Supp. 1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-2 (Supp. 1986)

(ii)

3, 4, 5, 24, 25, 26
3, 5, 8
6
3, 5, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-25 (1989)

3, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-27 (1989)

4, 20

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(3) (Supp. 1992)
Utah Code Ann. § 80-7-12 (1943)

1
26, n.9

Other Authority
The Economist Style Guide, p. 31 (1991)

(iii)

31, n.ll

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(3) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should Judge Rigtrup's decision, that plaintiff/

respondent Kennecott Corporation

("Kennecott") is entitled to

relief respecting its January 1, 1983 assessment by the Utah
State Tax Commission under this court's decision in Rio Algom
Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) holding Utah
Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) unconstitutional, be sustained?
2.

Would denial of relief to Kennecott constitute a

violation of Kennecottfs due process and equal protection rights
under the Utah and United States Constitutions?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are questions of
law.

The trial court's decisions on these issues are reviewed

for correctness.

Sharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah

1985) .
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS1
1.

Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2:

(1) All tangible property in the state,
not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this Constitution, shall be
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in

1

A verbatim presentation of the constitutional provisions and
statutes are included in the Addendum at page B-l.
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proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
provided by law.
2.

Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3:

The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all
tangible property in the state, according to
its value in money, . . . .
The Legislature
shall prescribe by law such provisions as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of
such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its tangible property,
3.

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution,

Section I:
. . . No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of
the laws.
4.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7:

No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
5.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24:

All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
6.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981):

All locally assessed taxable real property
shall be appraised at current fair market
value and the value of such property rolled
back to its January 1, 1978, level as such
level is determined by the state tax
commission.
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7.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 (Supp. 1986):

If the owner of any property assessed by the
state tax commission . . . objects to the
assessment, [it] may, before the tenth day of
April, apply to the commission for a
hearing. . . .
8.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 (Supp. 1983):

In all cases of levy of taxes, . . . which is
deemed unlawful by the party whose property
is thus taxed, . . . such party may pay under
protest such tax . . . to the officers designated and authorized by law to collect the
same; and thereupon the party so paying
. . . may bring an action in the tax division
of the appropriate district court . . . to
recover said tax . . . paid under protest.
9.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1981):

All taxable property, not specifically exempt
under Article XIII, section 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be assessed at 20% of
its reasonable fair cash value . . . .
10.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-2 (Supp. 1986):

(1) Within 30 days after notice of any decision by the state tax commission rendered
after a formal hearing before it, any
aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are
affected by the decision may appeal or petition for review to the tax division of the
district court located in the county of residence or principal place of business of the
affected taxpayer . . .
11.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-25 (1989):

If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim
or award during the current fiscal year it
may pay the claim or award in not more than
ten ensuing annual installments of equal size
or in such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
-3-

12.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-27 (1989):

(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, all political subdivisions may
levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay
the following:
(a)

any claim;

(b)

any settlement;

(c)

any judgment, . . . ;

(d) the cost to defend any claim, settlement, or judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance
of a reserve fund for the payment of claims,
settlements or judgments as may be reasonably
anticipated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This

case

is

an

appeal

by

Salt

Lake

County

(the

"County") from a summary judgment entered in favor of Kennecott
by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup of the Third Judicial District
Court on February 28, 1992 which reduced the assessed value of
Kennecottfs property assessed by the Utah State Tax Commission
(the "Commission") as of January 1, 1983, from $136,449,995 to
2
$123,405,445.

See Record at 696.

Kennecott originally brought

this proceeding before the Commission, pursuant to the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12

(Supp. 1986), and then appealed the

2

Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment dated February 28, 1992 are included in the Addendum at page A-l.
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Commission's decision to the Tax Division of the Third Judicial
District Court under the Tax Court Act.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-24-2 (Supp. 1986); Record at 1-5.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
1.

Kennecott initiated this case on June 1, 1983,

when it, pursuant to provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12,
supra, filed a petition with the Commission protesting the January 1, 1983 assessed value of Kennecottfs centrally assessed
property.

Kennecott received its Notice of Assessment from the

Commission on or about May 24, 1983.

Kennecott's petition

asserted that Kennecott should have its centrally assessed property treated in the same fashion as locally assessed property
under the "rollback" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, supra.
The Commission, after an informal hearing in which the County
appeared and participated, denied the assessed value reduction
sought by Kennecott.
2.

See Record at 1-5, 20-23.

In a related proceeding Kennecott filed a tax pro-

test action under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11
(Supp.

1983) with

the Third

Judicial

District

Court, Civil

No. C84-3049, wherein Kennecott requested from the District Court
the same relief it was seeking from the Commission in Kennecott!s
appeal of its centrally assessed property.

See Record at 21 and

Utah Supreme Court Case No. 92-0286, Kennecott Corporation v.
Salt Lake County.
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3.

After the Commission's informal hearing decision,

Kennecott requested a formal hearing.

Before the formal hearing

was held, this court issued its decision in Rio Alaom Mining
Corp.

v.

San

Juan

County,

supra,

holding

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 59-5-109, supra, unconstitutional in violation of Article XIII,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution.

Following a formal

hearing, the Commission again denied Kennecott the relief it
requested, i.e.. a reduction in the assessed value of Kennecottfs
centrally assessed real property.
4.

See Record at 20-23.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Tax Court Act,

Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-1 et seq. (Supp. 1986), Kennecott then
brought an action in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court appealing the Commission's refusal to reduce the
value

of Kennecott!s

centrally

assessed

real property.

See

Record at 1-5.
5.
Court

The Tax Division of the Third Judicial District

determined

that

Kennecott,

as

an

owner

of

centrally

assessed real property which had an appeal of the assessed value
of its centrally assessed property pending before the Commission
at the time Rio Algom waLS decided by this court, was entitled to
relief from the unconstitutional assessment of its property if. it
could meet the criteria for relief set out by the court in Rio
Alaom.

The Tax Division Court then remanded the case to the Com-

mission for further proceedings.
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See Record at 219-21.

6.

After another formal hearing, conducted by the

Commission following remand, the District Court entered summary
judgment sustaining the Commission's reduction in value of Kennecottfs centrally assessed real property as a result of Kennecottfs having met the Rio Algom criteria.
It is from this summary judgment

See Record at 697-701.

that the County is herein

appealing.
C.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented.
1.

On June 1, 1983, Kennecott filed a Protest of

Notice of Assessment and Petition for Hearing with the Commission
challenging the assessed value of Kennecott's centrally assessed
property as of January 1, 1983.

Kennecott received the Notice of

Assessment that was challenged in this protest on, or after, May
24, 1983.

See Record at 42-44.
2.

In its protest, Kennecott asserted that its cen-

trally assessed property was excessively valued in violation of
relevant provisions of the Utah Constitution because locally
assessed real property had its value rolled back to its 1978
level through the application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109,
supra, whereas the value of Kennecott!s centrally assessed real
property had not been rolled back.
3.

See Record at 20-23.

After an informal hearing held on June 29, 1983,

the Commission, in a decision dated January 26, 1984, denied
Kennecott any reduction in the assessed value of Kennecott!s

-7-

property.

On February 29, 1984, Kennecott petitioned the Commis-

sion for a formal hearing respecting the value of its centrally
assessed property.
4.

Id.

On May 23, 1984, Kennecott filed a tax protest

action under Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11

(Supp. 1983) with the

Third Judicial District Court respecting those property taxes it
paid Salt Lake County under protest on November 30, 1983.

The

relief sought in this tax protest action, and the grounds for
that relief, were virtually the same as in Kennecott's assessment
proceeding

pending before

the Commission.

That

tax protest

action, following a judgment entered in favor of Kennecott by
Judge Brian of the Third Judicial District Court, has also been
appealed by the County.

See Utah Supreme Court Case No. 92-0286,

Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County.
5.

Prior to the Commission's initial formal hearing

in this case on June 4, 1984, this court issued its decision on
March 13, 1984 in Rio Algom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County. 681
P.2d

184

(Utah 1984), which held Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109,

supra, unconstitutional as a violation of the plaintiff*s rights
under Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution
respecting taxes paid in 1981.

Kennecottfs request for a formal

hearing with the Commission was filed on February 29, 1984, prior
to this Courtf s decision in Rio Algom. supra. not after the

-8-

issuance of that decision as asserted by the County in the County's brief.
6.

See Record 20-97.
On June 27, 1985, the Commission issued its deci-

sion following the Commission's initial formal hearing which was
conducted on September 11, 1984.

In that decision the Commission

again refused to grant Kennecott any reduction in the assessed
value of Kennecott's property as of January 1, 1983, specifically
refusing

to apply

this court's holding

§ 59-5-109 was unconstitutional.

that Utah

Code Ann.

Even though the Commission's

formal hearing decision is dated June 27, 1985, it was not issued
by the Commission, or mailed to Kennecott, until October 31,
1985.

See Record 2-22.
7.

On November 27, 1985, Kennecott

filed a "Com-

plaint, Notice of Appeal, and Petition for Review of a Decision
of the Utah State Tax Commission" with the Tax Division of the
Third

Judicial

District

Court

of

Salt

Lake

County,

Civil

No. C85-8015, pursuant to the Utah Tax Court Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-24-2, supra, whereby it appealed the Commission's formal
hearing decision.

Kennecott asserted, in this lawsuit, that the

Commission's decision refusing to grant Kennecott the rollback
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 as of January 1, 1983, when that
rollback had been extended to locally assessed real property,
violated Kennecott's rights under Article XIII, Sections 2, 3 and
4 of the Utah Constitution.

See Record at 1-5.
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8.
Kennecott's

The Commission, and the County, in response to
complaint, brought

a Motion to Dismiss upon the

grounds that Rio Algom foreclosed any relief because Kennecott
was not one of the named plciintiffs in Rio Algom.
at 12.

See Record

The District Court denied this Motion to Dismiss, but

remanded the case to the Commission for a new formal hearing to
determine if Kennecott could meet the criteria for relief specified in Rio Algom, and, if so, what reduction should be granted.
See Record at 219-21.

The District Court specifically held as

follows:
Kennecott's protest of its 1983 ad valorem assessment was timely filed pursuant to
Utah Code Ann., section 59-7-12 (1953), and
was pending before the Utah State Tax Commission at the time the Utah Supreme Court
decided Rio Algom, et al. v. San Juan County,
et al., 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984). That case
does not deny a taxpayer having a pending
assessment challenge on March 13, 1984, the
date Rio Algom was decided, the opportunity
of fully pursuing its protest and obtaining
any relief to which it may be entitled pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 59-7-12
(1953), as amended. The decision following
formal hearing of the Utah State Tax Commission on Kennecott's valuation protest was
based upon the Tax Commission's interpretation of the decision in Rio Algom, an interpretation that Kennecott was entitled to no
relief under either Rio Algom. et al. v. San
Juan County, et al., supra, or Article XIII,
Section 2 and 3, Utah Constitution. The Commission made no findings and reached no conclusions about value, and as to whether the
requirements of Article XIII, Sections 2 and
3, Utah Constitution had been met.
This
decision by the Tax Commission was erroneous.

-10-

Record at 220.
9.

On June 24, 1987, following a formal hearing upon

remand, the Commission entered an Amended Final Decision and
Order which reduced the January 1, 1983 assessed value of Kennecott^ property from the original assessed value of $136,449,995
to $114,642,841.

See Record at 247-50.

That Amended Final Deci-

sion and Order was appealed to the District Court by the County.
The District Court again remanded the proceeding to the Commission for reexamination of Kennecottfs January 1, 1983 assessed
value in light of Rio Algom.
10.

See Record at 423-29.

On September 5, 1991, the Commission entered an

order, based upon another formal hearing held on August 15, 1990
after the second remand, which expressly held that Kennecott had
met the Rio Algom criteria for relief under that decision.

The

Commission then ordered a reduction in the assessed value of Kennecottfs

centrally

$123,405,445.
11.

assessed

property

from

$136,449,995

to

See Record at 457-61.
On February 28, 1992, the District Court entered

its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment"
which:
(a)

concluded that "comparable locally assessed

real property in Salt Lake County was undervalued by a factor of
1.4 in relation to Kennecott!s centrally assessed property as of
January 1, 1983";

-11-

(b)

"thcit in order to equalize the value of Ken-

necott ! s centrally assessed property with the assessed value of
comparable locally assessed property, Kennecott's real property
should have its assessed value rolled back by a factor of 1.4" as
of January 1, 1983; and
(c)

affirmed, in its entirety, through a de novo

independent review of the record before the Commission, the order
and decision of the Commission reducing the assessed value of
Kennecott's

centrally

$123,405,445.

assessed

property

from

$136,449,995

to

See Record at 696-701.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court correctly concluded that Rio Algom did
not

foreclose

Kennecott's

challenge

to

its

January

1,

1983

assessment upon the basis that Kennecott1s rights under Article
XIII, Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution were violated
when locally assessed real property was rolled back to its January 1, 1978 level, whereas Kennecott's centrally aissessed real
property was not given the benefit of that rollback.

Under Utah

law Kennecott had done everything in its power to protect its
assertion that Kennecott!s constitutional rights were violated by
the Commission in the original January 1, 1983 assessment.
Kennecott's

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 24
of the Utah Constitution will be violated if Kennecott is not

-12-

permitted to challenge its assessment as unlawful because of an
unconstitutional statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
JUDGE
RIGTRUP
WAS
CORRECT
IN HOLDING
KENNECOTT WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE
APPLICATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AS
TO KENNECOTT1S JANUARY 1, 1983 ASSESSMENT.
In Rio Algom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d
184 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) was unconstitutional and invalid because
the statute violated the provisions of Article XIII, Sections 2
and 3 of the Utah Constitution.

The statute which the court held

unconstitutional was effective in 1981, 1982, 1983 and, prior to
its repeal, in 1984.

In declaring that the Rio Algom plaintiffs1

rights under Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution were violated in 19 81, as a result of the implementation by
San Juan County of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, supra, the court
stated:
It necessarily follows that an indefinite,
partial freeze on the valuation of some properties in the state is inherently inconsistent with the basic concept of an ad valorem
tax system.
Inevitably, the statute would
produce valuations that are not based on market value and that are in violation of the
principal of uniformity.
681 P.2d at 195. And further:
In sum, the fixing of baseline assessments of
county-assessed real properties as of a given
year in the past, see Utah Hotel Company v.
-13-

Yoraason. Utah, 659 P.2d 1056 (1983), is a
violation of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3
and is unconstitutional,
681 P.2d at 195.
Following this declaration of unconstitutionality, the
court then discussed the effect its decision was to be given,
stating as follows:
One of the criticisms of giving only prospective effect to a decision is that it turns
the court's opinion into an advisory opinion
or dicta.
It also deprives the litigants,
who have sustained the burden of attacking an
unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of
their victory,. For this reason, prospective
effect may erven discourage challenges to
statutes
of questionable validity.
In
response to these considerations, some decisions that give only prospective effect to a
holding of unconstitutionality as to all
other parties give the holding retroactive
effect as to the litigants or others who have
litigation pending. [Citations deleted.] We
gave this kind of limited retroactive effect
to a decision that local government legislation was unconstitutional, a decision that
was otherwise prospective only.,
[Citations
deleted.]
For the same reasons that motivated the
foregoing decisions, we direct that our holding of unconstitutionality be prospective and
effective only from and after January 1,
1984. As to the six plaintiff-taxpayers who
are parties to this appeal, however, this
decision shall be retroactive for the year
for which this suit for refund was brought.
681 P.2d at 196.
The County, in this appeal, is aisserting that the meaning of the court's decision respecting the retroactive, versus

-14-

prospective, effect of Rio Algom is that Kennecott, a state
assessed property owner which took every step available under
Utah law to properly assert that its rights under the Utah constitution had been violated in the January 1, 1983 Commission
assessment, has no relief available to it even though Kennecott1s
constitutional
3
assessment.

rights

were

admittedly

violated

in

that

This argument by the County is not supported by Rio
Algom.

As shown in the language from Rio Algom reproduced above,

the court in that decision did not address the situation of parties who, at the time of the decision, had litigation pending
challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109,
Kennecott's precise position in this case. What was specifically
addressed in Rio Algom was (1) the rights of the six plaintiffs
in that case; and (2) the general retroactive effect of the holding that Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 was unconstitutional.

A care-

ful review of the Rio Algom decision reveals that with respect to

3

As is shown in Kennecott's Statement of Relevant Facts,
supra. Kennecott initiated its challenge to its 1983 assessment
as required under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 before the Rio Algom
decision was issued.
Not only did Kennecott challenge its
assessment before the Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12,
it also commenced the tax protest action under Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-11-11, supra, within six months of paying these taxes under
protest, when it became clear that no final decision respecting
Kennecott!s assessment would be forthcoming from the Commission
before the six month statute of limitations respecting tax protest actions would have run. Thus, Kennecott did all it could to
preserve its rights.
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the issue of prospectivity versus retroactivity, the court was
relying upon the law of pure prospectivity in setting an effective date of January 1, 1984, even though what was implemented by
the

court

in

prospectivity.
* .

•

•

-

Rio

Alaom

was

"modified"

or

"selective"

4

In a very recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court "selective" prospectivity, as urged by the County in this
case, was specifically rejected.
v. Georgia, 501 U.S.

In James B. Beam Distilling Co.

, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481

(1991), the Court held that "selective" prospectivity was inappropriate in a civil context because it violates the principles
of stare decisis and the rule of law.

In Beam the Court stated:

But selective prospectivity also breaches the
principle that litigants in similar situations
should be
treated
the same, a
4

"Selective" or "modified" prospectivity is a situation where
the new rule of law is applied to the litigants before the court,
and perhaps to others with litigation pending, retroactively, but
prospectively as to all others.
"Pure" prospectivity, is the
situation where the new rule of law is only applied after the
effective date of the newly announced rule of law. It is not
applied retroactively to anyone, including the litigants in the
case where the new rule is announced.
Each of the following
cases cited in the Rio Algom decision is a "pure" prospectivity,
not a "selective" prospectivity, decision: Loyal Order of Moose
v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982); Great Northern Railway
v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Northern Construction Pipeline Co.
v. Marathon Pipeline Co.. 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Cochise County. 377 P.2d 770 (Ariz. 1963); Deltona Corp.
v. Bailey, 336 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 1976); Jacobs v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov't. 450 SW.2d 10 (Ky. 1977); Salorio v.
Glaser, 461 A.2d 1100 (N.J. 1983); Soo Line Railroad v. State,
286 NW.2d 459 (N.D. 1979); Gottlieb v. Citv of Milwaukee. 147
NW.2d 633 (Wis. 1977).
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fundamental component of stare decisis and
the
rule
of
law generally.
See R.
Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision 69-72
(1961). "We depart from this basic judicial
tradition when we simply pick and choose from
among similarly situated defendants those who
alone will receive the benefit of a 'new1
rule of constitutional law."
Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59, 22
L.Ed.2d 248, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969) (Harlan,
J. , dissenting); see also. Von Moschzisker,
Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 409, 425 (1924). For this reason, we abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity in the criminal context in
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93
L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), even
where the new rule constituted a "clear
break" with previous law, in favor of completely retroactive application of all decisions to cases pending on direct review.
Though Griffith was held not to dispose of
the matter of civil retroactivity, see id. ,
at 322, n.8, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708,
selective prospectivity appears never to have
been endorsed in the civil context. [American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.] Smith,
496 U.S. [167] at
, 110 L.Ed.2d 148, 110
S. Ct. 2323 (plurality opinion). This case
presents the issue.5
Ill S. Ct. 2445, 115 L.Ed.2d 489-90.
In Beam, the plaintiff brought an action against Georgia seeking a refund of taxes paid under a statute which had been
held unconstitutional

in violation of the commerce clause in

5

The Court's opinion in Beam was a plurality decision, written by Justice Souter and joined in by Justice Stevens. Justice
White wrote a concurring opinion which also rejected "selective"
prospectivity, but reserved the issue of "pure" prospectivity.
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion which was joined in by
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, would have rejected both "selective" and "pure" prospectivity as not permitted by the constitution. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Kennedy dissented.
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Bacchus Imports Ltd, v, Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82
L.Ed.2d 200 (1984).

Both the trial court, a state court, and the

Supreme Court of Georgia declared the challenged tax unconstitutional and enjoined any future enforcement, but denied the liquor
manufacturer's tax refund request holding that the ruling was to
apply only prospectively.

In Beam, the Court reversed the deci-

sion of the Georgia Supreme Court, holding that because the
Bacchus case applied retroactively to the litigants in that case,
the Bacchus rule would also have to be applied to the plaintiff
in Beam, a similarly situated litigant.

In so holding, the Court

stated:
Bacchus thus applied its own rule, just as if
it had reversed and remanded without further
ado, and yet of course the Georgia courts
refused to apply that rule with respect to
the litigants in this case. Thus, the question is whether it is error to refuse to
apply a rule of federal law retroactively
after the case announcing the rule has
already done so. We hold that it is, principles of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron Oil
analysis.
Ill S. Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491. And further;
Of course, retroactivity in civil cases must
be limited by the need for finality, see
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 84 L.Ed. 329, 60 S.
Ct. 317 (1940); once suit is barred by res
judicata or by statutes of limitation or
repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door
already closed.
Ill S. Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 492.
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The Court's analysis in Beam is particularly apropos in
this case.

In Rio Algom. just as in Bacchus. the litigants had

the ruling applied retroactively.

In Rio Algom that ruling was

applied to the Rio Algom plaintiffs in 1981, even though the
decision that Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 was unconstitutional was
issued on March 13, 1984.

Similarly, in this case, Kennecott

sought to have that ruling applied to it for tax year 1983, two
years after 1981, the year in which the Rio Algom plaintiffs were
litigating their taxes.

For the reasons enunciated in Beam, Rio

Algom should not be read as foreclosing Kennecott's right to
relief from the application of an unconstitutional statute in
1983, when Kennecott is not only "similarly situated" to the Rio
Algom plaintiffs, but had litigation pending over the exact issue

6

The Supreme Court of Washington in Robinson v. City of Seattle. 119 Wash. 2d 34,
, 830 P.2d 318, 342-43 (1992), adopted
the Court's analysis and result in Beam when it rejected selective prospectivity. The Washington court stated:
We are persuaded that the Beam Distilling
holding is sound.
While our decision in
National Can relied in part on the Chevron
Oil analysis, we now modify our rule from
National Can in a manner consistent with the
limitations on the Chevron Oil rule effected
in Beam Distilling. We expressly limit our
holding in this case to the abolishment of
selective prospectivity in the application of
our state appellate decisions.
Id.
830 P.2d at 343.
Utah should also reject selective
prospectivity and sustain the trial court's decision in this
case.
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decided in Rio Algom at the time the decision in that case was
issued.
In Rio Algom the court expressed some concern that to
apply its holding that Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 was unconstitutional

could mean

that

"local governments will be subject

enormous financial and administrative burdens."
P.2d at 195, and further:

concern

is

Rio Algom. 681

"Local governments operate on very

precise and often strained budgets . . . "
This

to

largely

Id.

nonexistent

in

this

case.

Political subdivisions in Utah, including Salt Lake County, have
specific authority to levy taxes to raise revenue in order to
satisfy

judgments

rendered

against

them.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 63-30-27 (1989) specifically provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, all political subdivisions may
levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay
the following:
(a)

any claim;

(b)

any settlement;

7

The court in Rio Algom, at page 196, cites one other Utah
case where "selective" prospectivity had been announced and
applied. In Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. 1, 16 Utah
2d 280, 283, 399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965), the court granted a taxpayer a declaratory judgment holding the County Service Area Act
unconstitutional, but stating; "In so declaring we desire it to
be understood that this ruling applies to the instant controversy, and apart from this, the decision is to have prospective
not retroactive effect.11 No damage relief, tax refund relief, or
injunctive relief was sought by plaintiff in that case.
Thus,
the case may be more properly read as a "pure" prospectivity case
since no other citizens1 rights were adversely impacted by the
decision of prospectivity.
-20-

(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an elected official or employee
of any political subdivision, including peace
officers, based upon a claim for punitive
damages but the authority of a political subdivision for the payment of any judgment for
punitive damages is limited in any individual
case to $10,000;
(d) the cost to defend any claim, settlement, or judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance
of a reserve fund for the payment of claims,
settlements or judgments as may be reasonably
anticipated.
(2) . . .
No levy under this section may
exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of
taxable property. The revenues derived from
this levy may not be used for any other purpose than those stipulated in this section.
Furthermore, to the extent a financial hardship may be
imposed upon one of Utah's political subdivisions because of the
need to refund taxes, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-25

(1989) specifi-

cally permits the payment of an "award" in installments.
the

"hardship" expressed by

least, minimal.

the County

Thus

is nonexistent, or at

Certainly any "hardship" should not permit the

County and the Commission to violate Kennecott's constitutional
rights under Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution and then retain the funds extorted as a result of that violation.
out

This is simply unconscionable, and as will be pointed

hereinbelow,

will

result

in
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a

separate

violation

of

Kennecott's rights to due process of law and equal protection
Q

under the United States and Utah constitutions.
POINT II
DENIAL OF RELIEF TO KENNECOTT RESPECTING ITS
JANUARY 1, 1983 ASSESSMENT WILL VIOLATE KENNECOTT1 S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH
CONSTITUTIONS.
Denying relief to Kesnnecott in this case will result in
Kennecott being unable to obtain any relief from an unconstitutional assessment.

Consequently, such a denial will result in a

separate violation

of Kennecott's

due process

rights.

This

becomes clear when the recent decision of the United States
Supreme

Court

in

McKesson

Corp.

8

v.

Division

of

Alcoholic

The County and the court may have some concern that a decision in Kennecott!s favor may result in a series of lawsuits by
others over the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109.
That concern is also addressed by Judge Souter in his Beam opinion, where he stated that the retroactivity principle announced
in Beam is necessarily limited by appropriate statutes of limitation as well as the doctrine of res judicaita. In this situation,
further litigation over Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, supra, is
highly unlikely. If a state assessed taxpayer believed his real
property assessment by the Commission was unlawful because of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, he would have had to bring that assertion before the Commission within 30 days of having received his
Notice of Assessment in 1981, 1982 or 1983. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-7-12 (1975). If that taxpayer decided to bring a tax protest action challenging the taxes he paid as a result of an
unconstitutional assessment, that action would have to have been
brought within six months of the date the taxes were paid under
protest, or before May 30, 1984 at the latest. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-31 (1992) and Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v.
Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987).
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Beverages & Tobacco. 496 U.S. 18, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17
(1990) is examined.
In McKesson. Florida enacted an excise tax scheme for
alcoholic beverages which granted preferential rates to certain
citrus, grape and sugarcane products, all of which were commonly
grown in Florida and used in alcoholic beverages produced in that
state.

McKesson Corp. ("McKesson"), a liquor distributor whose

products did not qualify for the reduced tax rate, filed an
application

for a tax refund with the Florida

Comptrollers

office upon the grounds that the tax scheme was unlawful in violation

of

the

commerce

clause

and

the

Court's

decision

in

Bacchus. supra.
The refund request was denied.
the refund in a Florida state court.

McKesson then sued for
Eventually the Florida

Supreme Court held the tax scheme unconstitutional and sustained
an injunction against future enforcement of the preferred rate
scheme, but refused to grant any refund or other relief for the
taxes McKesson had already paid.

In a unanimous decision, the

United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's
refusal to order a tax refund, or grant other relief with respect
to those taxes McKesson had already paid, holding that denying
such relief violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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In McKesson, the Court stated:
It is undisputed that the Florida
Supreme Court, after holding that the Liquor
Tax unconstitutionally discriminated against
interstate commerce because of its preferences for liquor made from "crops which Florida is adapted to growing," 524 So.2d, at
1008, acted correctly in awarding petitioner
declaratory amd injunctive relief against
continued enforcement of the discriminatory
provisions.
The question before us is
whether
prospective
relief, by
itself,
exhausts the requirements of federal law.
The answer is no: if a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when
due and relegaLtes him to a postpayment refund
action in which he can challenge the tax's
legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to
rectify any unconstitutional deprivation.
496 U.S. at 31. And further:
To satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, therefore, in this refund action
the State must provide taxpayers with, not
only a fair opportunity to challenge the
accuracy and legal validity of their tax
obligation, but also a "clear and certain
remedy,"
TAtchison, T.&S.F.R.
Co. v.1
0' Connor. 223 U.S. at 285, 56 L.Ed. 436, 32
S. Ct. 216, for any erroneous or unlawful tax
collection to ensure that the opportunity to
contest the tcix is a meaningful one.
Had the Florida courts declared the Liquor
Tax invalid either because (other than its
discriminatory nature) it was beyond the
State's power
to impose, as was the
unapportioned tax in O'Connor, or because the
taxpayers were absolutely immune from the
tax, as were the Indian Tribes in Ward and
Carpenter, no corrective action by the State
could cure the invalidity of the tax during
the contested tax period.
The State would
have had no choice but to "undo" the unlawful
deprivation by refunding the tax previously
-24-

paid under duress, because allowing the State
to "collect these unlawful taxes by coercive
means and not incur any obligation to pay
them back . . . would be in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
496 U.S. at 39.
In the circumstances presented in this case, Kennecott
can only protest, or litigate, a Tax Commission assessment it
believes to be unlawful pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 59-7-12 (Supp. 1986), which states:
If the owner of any property assessed by the
state tax commission or any county with a
showing of reasonable cause objects to the
assessment, either may, before the tenth day
of April, apply to the commission for a hearing.
Both the owner or the county upon a
showing of reasonable cause shall be allowed
to be a party at any hearing under this
section.
The tax commission shall set a time for hearing the objection from April 10 until April
22.
At the hearing the tax commission may
increase, lower or sustain the assessment, if
the commission finds an error in the assessment or if it is necessary to equalize the
assessment
with
out
similarly
assessed
property.
In Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah
426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946), this court held that a taxpayer whose
personal property was assessed by the Commission could not challenge that assessment as unlawful, because it was fraudulent, in
a declaratory judgment action respecting the legal ability of the
Commission to assess and tax the taxpayer's property.

The court

held that any such challenge was required to be brought before
-25-

the Commission under the predecessor to Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12,
9
supra.
In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Plaintiffs further contend that: the assessments of their cars were fraudulent per se
because in their valuation no account was
taken of their diverse ages but all were
given the same valucition per car. We are not
impressed with this argument in view of the
fact that plaintiffs at no time before they
commenced this action protested the valuation
placed on their cars, as provid€>d for in Sec.
80-7-12, U.C.A. 1943. Had any of the plaintiffs been of the opinion that their cars
were being overvaluated they had an opportunity under this section to apply to the commission within the time allowed, to have the
valuations corrected and they would have been
entitled to ai hearing of the matter. This
they did not do. . . . This court is committed to the view that in the absence of fraud
or bad faith on the part of the assessor, his
valuation is conclusive unless changed by the
Board of Equalization on application of the
taxpayer, and that this remedy which the legislature had provided for the taxpayer is
exclusive unless willfulness, arbitrariness,
fraud or bad faith can be clearly shown.

9
The text of Utah Code Ann. § 80-7-12 (1943), at the time of
the Crystal Car Line decision, read as follows:
If the owner of any property assessed by the
State Tax Commission is dissatisfied with the
assessment made by it, such owner may,
between the third Monday in May and the second Monday in June, apply to the Commission
to have the same corrected in any particular,
and it shall set a time for hearing such
objections and may correct and increase or
lower any assessment made by it, so as to
equalize the same with the assessment of
other property in the state.
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174 P.2d at 991.
Thus, when Kennecott determined that the assessment of
its real property by the Commission was excessive and unlawful
because of a rollback granted to locally assessed real property,
but not to Kennecott's property, Kennecott's only recourse was to
contest that assessment under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12, supra.
This is exactly the course Kennecott pursued.
Under McKesson, due process of law requires that a
state give a taxpayer " . . .

a fair opportunity to challenge the

accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation" and "a clear
and certain remedy."

496 U.S. at 39.

If this court does not

sustain the trial court's determination that Kennecott was entitled to challenge its assessment in 1983, but agrees with the
County

that

Rio

Alaom

forecloses

any

remedy

available

to

Kennecott for an assessment under a statute which was unconstitutional in 1981, and also in 1983, then the Court will have denied
Kennecott a "clear and certain remedy" which McKesson requires
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must be available so that Kennecott's due process rights are not
violated.
The County may argue that McKesson doesn't apply in
this case because the assessment Kennecott is

challenging was

unlawful as a result of Utah state, not federal law.

That asser-

tion was addressed by the court in Smith v. Travis County Education District, 791 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Tex. 1992), vacated on other
grounds, 968 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1992).
In Travis County, the court held that imposition of
taxes which were violative of the Texas State Constitution constituted

a violation

of

the

due

process

of

law

guarantees

afforded taxpayers by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.

In so holding, the United States

District Court for the Western District of Texas stated:
As the State correctly argues, McKesson
involved a tax that was held unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. Consequently, the state
proceeds to argue that McKesson should not be
held to apply to state tax schemes that only
violate state law. A distinction should be
10

The effect of the decision denying Kennecott any relief in
this case is to deny Kennecott any relief whatsoever. Utah Code
Ann. § 59-5-109, supra, was repealed by the Legislature following
this court!s decision in Rio Alaom. Kennecott's right to relief
in the tax protest action which is relcited to this assessment
proceeding is entirely dependent upon the improper assessment of
Kennecottfs property by the Commission due to the rollback statute. Thus, denial of a possibility of relief in this case forecloses any relief available to Kennecott in the tax protest case.
See Kennecott Corp. v. S.L. County: Utah State Supreme Court Case
No. 92-0286.
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recognized, but perhaps a distinction should
also be recognized between tax schemes that
merely violate a state or local statute and
tax schemes that violate a state's constitution. The basic issue is whether the State
provides a remedy. The issue in the present
action is the State's continued enforcement
of a tax scheme that has been found unconstitutional under the State constitution. Such
a continued enforcement would violate the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.
791 F. Supp. at 1190-91.
That this continued imposition of taxes violation of a
state constitutional provision also constitutes a violation of
federal due process was directly addressed in Travis County as
follows:
Once a state taxation scheme has been
declared invalid under the state constitution, the taxpayers of that state must be
given a substantive means to protest any payments of taxes incurred under such a scheme.
A merely pro forma state remedy does not satisfy the demands of due process under the
United States Constitution.
791 F.Supp. at 1203.
The analysis of whether imposition of a tax unlawful
under state law constitutes a violation of the federal constitution is similar to an analysis of a due process of law violation
under Utah's Constitution.

See Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v.

Industrial Comm'n. 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982) (Decisions relating to
the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution are highly persuasive when interpreting the due process
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clause of the Utah Constitution); Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm'n.
102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942).

Article I, Section 7 of the

Utah Constitution, independent of federal constitutional guarantees, protects Kennecott from any action of the Commission, the
County, or another Utah government unit, including Utah's Legislature, which results in a deprivation of Kennecott's property
without due process of law.

Kennecott submits that if this court

does not sustain Judge Rigtrup's decision that Kennecott was
entitled to challenge the Commission's assessment eis of January
1, 1983, and also that Kennecott was entitled to a reduction in
the assessed value of its property when Kennecott demonstrated
that its assessment violated Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of
the Utah Constitution, then Kennecott's due process rights under
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution will be violated.
Not only does failure to grant Kennecott a remedy for
the unconstitutional assessment of its property in 19 83 constitute a violation of federal and state guarantees of due process
of law, it also violates Kennecottfs equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
As pointed out by the Court in Beam. " . . .

similarly

situated litigants should be treated the same, . . .

" 111 S.

Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491.

See also. City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center. Inc.. 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249,
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87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,f which
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102
S. Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause
directs

that

f

all

persons

similarly

circumstanced

shall

be

treated alike1"); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission. 488 U.S. 336, 343-345, 109 S. Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688
(1989) (the Equal Protection Clause applies to taxation which
bears unequally on persons or property of the same class).
Furthermore, Beam held that "selective" prospectivity,
i.e., selecting certain litigants to receive the benefit of a
newly announced rule of law, while denying that benefit to all
other litigants, violates the "rule of law."
2447, 115 L.Ed.2d at 493.

See. Ill S. Ct. at

In this case, Kennecott had pending

before the Commission its assessment challenge, as required if
Kennecott desired to challenge its assessed value, at the time
Rio Algom was decided.

The fact that the Rio Algom plaintiffs

had the good fortune to be before the Utah Supreme Court, whereas
Kennecott was litigating the exact same issue before the Tax Commission, was purely fortuitous. 11

11

According to the Economist Style Guide, "fortuitous means
accidental, not fortunate. or well-timed." The Economist Style
Guide, p. 31, (1991), The Economist Books, Ltd.
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Consequently, applying the Rio Alaom rule to the Rio
Algom plaintiffs, but not to Kennecott, only because Kennecott
was not one of the lucky six plaintiffs in Rio Alaom. is a wholly
arbitrary distinction or classification, a completely accidental
result.
When the only distinction that can be drawn between
"similarly situated litigants,11 some of whom receive the benefit
of a ruling, i.e., the Rio Alaom plaintiffs, and others who do
not receive any such benefit, i.e., Kennecott, is simply because
of good fortune. or accident, the party left out in the cold has
had its rights to equal protection under the law violated.

The

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
Kennecott against just such an arbitrary and accidental result.
Article I, Section 24, of Utah's Constitution also protects Kennecott from the result the County seeks in this case.
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah
1989) and Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Commission. 796 P.2d 1256,
1261 (Utah 1990) , the principle was established that a violation
of Article I, Section 24, of Utah's Constitution would also be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Kennecott submits that the converse is also true.

Any

violation of Kennecott's rights to equal protection of the law
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
will also constitute ci violation of Kennecottfs rights under
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Article I, Section 24 of Utah's Constitution because Utah's Constitution provides more protection than the Fourteenth Amendment
against arbitrary and unreasonable action by government units in
Utah.
CONCLUSION
As is shown herein, Judge Rigtrup's decision in this
case that Kennecott could maintain its action for an unlawful
assessment by the Utah State Tax Commission in violation of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of Utah's Constitution was correct.
To hold otherwise will violate the principles of stare decisis
and the rule of law.

Reversal

of the trial court will also

result in a violation of Kennecott's rights to due process of law
and equal protection as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 24
of the Utah Constitution.

Judge Rigtrup's decision should be

sustained.
Respectfully submitted this f9

day of October, 1992.

7AMES B. LEE
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
Kennecott Corporation
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
(801) 532-1234
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RESPONDENT to the following on this /$?— day of October, 1992:
Karl Hendrickson
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Bill Thomas Peters
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310 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Third Judicial District

FEB 2 8 1992
C'Ai.r LAKE COUNTY

JAMES B. LEE (1919)
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER (3525)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Kennecott Corporation
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Deputy Cl&rk

IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

KENNECOTT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Petitioner/
Appellant,

FINDINGS OF *"ACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AND ^JlIH^^H0l5SMEN?I^
vs.
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH and SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants/Respondents.

Civil No. C85-8015
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

* * * * * * * *

Plaintiff Kennecott Corporation's, (,/Kennecott,/) motion
for summary judgment was heard by the court on October 28, 1991.
Kennecott was represented at the hearing by its attorney Kent W.
Winterholler of Parsons Behle & Latimer.

Salt Lake County was

represented by its attorney Bill Thomas Peters.

Appearing at the

hearing in behalf of the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") was its attorney, Rick Carlton.

At the conclusion of the

hearing the court directed that the Tax Commission's record of
the hearings held in this case before the Tax Commission, upon

0GG65G

which Kennecott's motion was based, be transmitted to the court.
The

order

directing

the

transmission

of

this

Tax

record was entered by the court on October 29, 1991.

Commission
Thereafter,

the court received the record of the Tax Commission's hearings in
this appeal and review proceeding, and has reviewed

the same.

Kennecott and Salt Lake County both submitted memoranda of law
respecting their positions in this proceeding.
The court now having heard the arguments of counsel,
having reviewed the respective memoranda of the parties, and having reviewed the record of the proceedings held before the Tax
Commission, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby
enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
located
Division

in Salt Lake County,
of

$136,449,995.
assigned

The total assessed value of Kennecott's property

to

improvements.

the

Tax

Commission

Included
land

and

as assessed

in

as

that

$39,731,840

of

by the Property Tax

January

assessment
assigned

to

1,
was

1983, was
$5,924,084

buildings

and

This total Kennecott real property assessed value

of $45,655,924 represents twenty (20) percent of the fair market
value of Kennecott's land, buildings and improvements as determined by the Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57
(Supp. 1983).

-2-

2.

The

total

Tax

Commission

assessed

value

of

$45,655,924 assigned to real property did not include any assessment

for Kennecott's mine and mining

claims as of January

1,

1983.
3.

The Utah State Tax Commission used the comparable

sales method of valuation, or market approach to value, for its
valuation

of

assessment of

Kennecott's

land

$45,655,924.

included

in

the

real

property

The Tax Commission in assessing the

buildings and improvements included in Kennecott's real property
assessment of $45,685,294 used a cost approach to value, or a
replacement cost new less depreciation methodology, based upon
the Marshall & Swift Cost Manual.
4.
ogies

Salt Lake County used the same valuation methodol-

in assessing

locally

assessed

commercial

and

industrial

land and improvements as of January 1, 1983, as was used by the
Tax Commission in assessing Kennecott's real property as of January 1, 1983.
the

market

Both the comparable sales method of valuation, or

approach,

as well

as

the

cost

approach

valuation

method used by both the Tax Commission and Salt Lake County for
1983 are used to arrive at fair market values and both methods
account for inflation or deflation as these factors may affect
the fair market value of real property.
5.

In

1983

Salt

Lake

County

reduced

the

assessed

value of land and improvements assessed by the Salt Lake County

0QGSS3

Assessor by a factor of 1.4 to roll back these land and improvement values to 1978 levels pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1983).
6.

Kennecott's

real

property

assessment

as

accom-

plished by the Tax Commission was not reduced by the 1.4 factor,
or rolled back to 1978 levels by the Tax Commission, in assigning
an assessed value to Kennecott's real property of $4 5,655,924.
If the Tax Commission had applied the same roll back factor to
Kennecott's real property as was assigned by the Salt Lake County
Assessor's office to locally assessed real property,

so as to

reduce the assessed value of Kennecott's real property, the total
assessment of Kennecott's centrally assessed property as of January 1, 1983 would have been $123,405,445.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court
hereby makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Because the Salt Lake County Assessor rolled back

the value of locally cissessed real property by a factor of 1.4,
which real property was assessed by the same methodology as was
Kennecott's
1983,

centrally

comparable

assessed

locally

real property

assessed

real

as of January 1,

property

in

Salt

Lake

County was undervalued by a factor of 1.4 in relation to Kennecott's centrally assessed property as of January 1, 1983.

-4-

2.

In order to equalize the valuation of Kennecott's

centrally assessed property with the assessed value of comparable
locally assessed property, Kennecott's real property should have
its assessed value rolled back by a factor of 1.4.

This results

in an assessed value for Kennecott's centrally assessed property
located

in

Salt

Lake

County

as

of

January

1,

1983

of

$123,405,445.
3.

The records of the Utah State Tax Commission and

of the Salt Lake County Treasurer, Auditor and Assessor shall be
corrected so as to reflect that the total assessed value of Kennecott 's centrally assessed property located in Salt Lake County
as of January 1, 1983 shall be $123,405,445.
4.
of

the

Tax

The September 5, 1991 and October 25, 1991 orders
Commission

are

amply

supported

by

the

evidence

contained in the Tax Commission's record of these proceedings.
The court's de novo, independent review of the record satisfies
the court that Kennecott has demonstrated to the court and the
Tax Commission, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Tax
Commission's orders of September

5, 1991 and October 25, 1991

should be, and hereby are, affirmed in their entirety.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby awarded in favor of Kennecott reducing the assessed value of Kennecott's centrally assessed property
located

in Salt

Lake

County

as of January

- 5 -

1,

1983

from

* . • • - --»

the

assessed value originally assigned by the Utah State Tax Commission of

$136,449,995, to the Tax Commission assessed value as

reflected and stated in the Utah State Tax Commission's Order of
September 5, 1991 of $123,405,445.
DATED this

%$ ~day of February, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGEl KENNETH RI
District Court Jiidge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following on
this /j/JL

day of fZ>/s<saL+xJ

\W2\

Bill Thomas Peters, Special Deputy
Salt Lake County Attorney
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Rick Carlton
Asst. Utah State Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

^
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ADDENDUM B

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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Amend. XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16,
1866; declared to have been ratified by threefourths of all the states on July 28, 1868.

AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not
to disqualify.]

Section
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.

Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
History: Proposed by Congress on February
27, 1869; declared to have been ratified by

more than three-fourths of all the states on
March 30, 1870.

AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes., from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.
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Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities. 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=>
83H)| 121 to 123.

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

Sec- 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 "(2nd S.S.), § 2.

History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compilers Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia. 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=> 82;
Weapons <§= 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals; any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

Art. I, § 24

mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises
§§ 9 to 23.

C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26.
Key Numbers. — Franchises *=» 11.

Sec, 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Age of majority.
Agent for service of process.
Automobile license law.
Construction with Art. VI, § 26.
Contract carrier permit.
Cosmetologists' license law.
Criminal actions.
—Investigations.
—Prosecution.
—Sentence.
Criminal sentence.
Disparate tax assessments.
Excess revenue refunds.
Guest statutes.
Inheritance Tax Law.
Insurance premium tax exemption.
Intoxicating liquor.
Licenses.
Massage parlor ordinance.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Notice requirements.
Property.
—Responsibility for water service.
Public employees' retirement system.
Public officers' bonds.
Public officers' salaries.
Road poll tax.
School activities.
Search warrants.
Sunday closing laws.
Tax sales.
Unfair Practices Act.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted. State v.
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R.
696 (1921).
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. &
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
(1941).
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such.
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act. State v. J.B. & R E . Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc.. 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (194D.
Inability of legislature to make perfect classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100
Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreasonable distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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REVENUE AND TAXATION

Art. XIII, § 2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Bond issue.
City ordinance authorizing bond issue for
improvement of waterworks and specifying
that for purpose of servicing bonds fiscal year
should continue same as calendar year was not

invalid as attempting to fix fiscal year other
than that provided by this section. Fjeldsted v.
Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933);
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28
P.2d 161 (1933).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 357.
Key Numbers. — Taxation *= 318.

Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascertained — Exemptions — Remittance or abatement of taxes of poor — Intangible property —
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.]
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
(2) The following are property tax exemptions:
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries;
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city,
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to
the ad valorem property tax;
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by
statute.
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state.
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted.
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes.
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for
229
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in
such manner as may be provided by law.
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of
not to exceed 45?f of the fair market value of residential property as defined
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for
himself and family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the
Legislature may provide.
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation.
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years
from the final passage of the law creating the debt.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1930 (Spec. Sess.),
S.J.R. 2; 1945, H.J.R. 3; 1957, H.J.R. 7; 1961,
S.J.R. 6; 1963, S.J.R. 5; 1967, S.J.R. 1; 1982,
S.J.R. 3; 1986, H.J.R. 18.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1959, Senate
Joint Resolution No. 5 proposed a constitutional amendment to be voted on by the electors at the general election in 1960. The proposed amendment failed to pass because it did
not receive the necessary majority.
The 1979 proposed amendments to this section by House Joint Resolutions Nos. 23 and 25
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint
Resolution No. 6, Laws 1980.
Laws 1986, Senate Joint Resolution No. 4,
proposed to amend Subsection (2)(c) of this section. The proposed amendment was submitted
to the electors at the general election in 1986
and failed to pass because it did not receive the
necessary majority.
Cross-References. — Armories exempt
from taxation, § 39-2-1.
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, § 2-1-41.

County service area property exempt,
§ 17A-2-429.
Disabled veteran's exemption, §§ 59-2-1104,,
59-2-1105.
Exemptions generally, § 59-2-1101 et seq.,
Chapter 23 of Title 78.
Indigent persons, abatement or deferral of
taxes, §§ 59-2-1107 to 59-2-1109.
Industrial facilities development property
exempt, § 11-17-10.
Mine and mining claim improvements, machinery or structures not exempt, § 59-5-64.
Privilege tax on possession and use of taxexempt properties, § 51-4-101.
Property of higher education institutions exempt, § 53B-20-106.
Property tax relief, § 59-2-1201 et seq.
Rate of assessment of property, § 59-2-103
School property exempt from taxation,
§ 53A-3-408.
Tangible personal property held for sale on
January 1 exempt, § 59-2-1114.
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-ty, and assessment based thereon was in
•n
^.. .«uon of this section. Harmer v. State Tax
ix
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 324,, 452 P.2d 876 (1969).
'>•
'n
ed in Salt Lake County v. Tax Comm'n
t* . c i . Utah Transit Auth., 780 P.2d 1231
COI I -A I ERAI
Utah Law Review. — Note, Financing1
Modernized and Unmodernized Local Goveniment in the Age of Aquarius. 1971 I'tRev. 30.
Housing in Salt Lake County • A Place i
Live for the Poor?, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 19.3
Brigham Young Law Review. — A Muni'
ipality's Interest in an Electrical Power Gene ating Facility: Some Tax Considerations, x *
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 125
Am. Jur. 2d, - 71 Am. Jur. 2d St in .-MI
Local Taxation §§ 194 et seq., 307 et seq
C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 52, 57 et
seq,, 215 et seq.

S I T -I!

AIt

(I It i ii 1989); Salt Lake County ex rel. County
Bd. of Equalization v. State Tax Comm'n ex
rel. Kemiecott Corp., 779 P.2d 1131 (Utah
1989).

REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, 56 A.L.R.4th 539.
Property taxi effect of tax-exempt lessor's renary interest on valuation of nonexempt
- interest, 57 A.L.R.4th 950.
on from real-property taxation of
facilities maintained by hospital for
t .II, or others, 61 A.L.R.4th 1105.
", of federal court's ordering state or
oca tax increase to effectuate civil rights devret 76 A.L.R. Fed. 504.
Key Numbers. — Taxation «= 49, 57 et seq.,

[ Assessment and taxation of tangible property • Livestock — Land used for agricultural purposes.,]

(] ) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,
ex-<>pt as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall
}.-. -cribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock,
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes,
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the
value it may have for other purposes.
History : Const 1896; Nov , 6, 1900; Nov, 6,
5,
1906; L. 1930 (S..S ) S.J.R. 2; 1946 (1st S.S.),
),
H.J.R. 2; 1967', S.J.R. 2; 1982, S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. - - The 1979 proposedd
amendment of this section by Hoi ise Jo i nt Res

olution No. 23 was repca.ea ai,u *,.;-.j-avn by
Senate Joint Resolution No. 6. Laws 1980.
Cross-References.
— Uniform School
Fund, taxes allocated to, § 53A-16-101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
"According to value in money" construed
Charitable association.
Co-operative corporation property.
County clerk's probate fees.
County improvement district contingent \.a\.
Disparity in state .i"-4 *•- * lt, .^-x-^rnf "•
Double taxation.
Drainage assessments.

( ) c c u p a t i o n and license tax e s.
RemJSSJon of taxes of indigent or insane persons.
Road poll taxes.
Roll-back of assessed value.
Special assessments.
State property.
Telephone license tax.
Uniformity and equality.
Utility rates.
Cited.
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Sec. 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and multiple — What to be assessed as tangible property.]
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both placer and rock in place,
shall be assessed as the Legislature shall provide; but the basis and multiple
now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation purposes and the additional assessed value of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be
changed before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by
law. All other mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits,
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed
as other tangible property.
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 8, 1908; L. 1930
(S.S.), S.J.R. 5; 1982, S.J.R. 3.

Cross-References. — Statutory- provisions,
§ 59-2-201.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Drain tunnels.
Under this section, drain tunnels, used to
drain a mine, may not be separately taxed
where it appears that they have no separate
and independent value, but are inseparably
connected with the operation of the mine.
Ontario Silver Mining Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah
359. 164 P. 498 (1917).

ANALYSIS

Construction and operation of section.
Drain tunnels.
Notice.
Unpatented mining claims.
Water rights.
Construction and operation of section.
Classification under this section as it formerly read was not intended to limit phrase
"or other valuable mineral deposits," but embraced all mineral deposits including gypsum,
and net annual profits from products manufactured therefrom were taxable. Nephi Plaster &
Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 P.
53, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1043 (1907).
Under this section as it once read, a blanket
assessment of all coal lands in county could not
be made at a flat or uniform rate. Ririe v. Randolph, 51 Utah 274, 169 P. 941 (1917).
Under this section as it formerly read, it was
held that for purpose of taxing net proceeds of
mines, the cost of mining incurred in any one
year must be considered independently from
the cost incurred in any other year, and only
such costs as were incurred during year in
which net proceeds were obtained could be considered. Mammoth Mining Co. v. Juab County,
51 Utah 316, 170 P. 78 (1918).

Notice.
Assessment of mines was not defective
where notice described property with reasonable certainty as to locality and identity. Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc. v. Moffitt, 257
F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1958).
Unpatented mining claims.
A tax imposed under state law upon the possessory right to explore and develop mines located upon unpatented claims located upon
land belonging to the unappropriated public
domain of the United States is not open to challenge upon the ground that it constitutes a tax
against property belonging to the United
States. Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc. v.
Moffitt, 257 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1958).
Water rights.
Water rights are taxable whether considered
appurtenant to mine or independent property.
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62
Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (1923).
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59-5-1
CHAPTER 5
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY
Article
1. Gei icral provisions.
2 Assessment by county assessor.
4 Duties of county assessor.
6. Assessment by state tax commission.
7. Mining occupation tax.
8. Farmland assessment act of 1969.
9. Administration of property tax assessment.
10. Real property plat map.

GE\KK\I I KUYJSIONS
Sor tion

r»" I *' i I

R; 11 e o f a s s e s s i i I e n 1: o f p r o p e :r

t i I 11 n e 11 i e e d c o m p u t a t i o n s.

59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property
School district unmet need corn
putations. All taxable property, not specifically exempt under Article XIII, section
2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be assessed at 2fr%- 20% of its reasonable fair
cash value. Land and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed,
School district unmet need computations for critical school building aid shall be
determined as though the bonding capacity had not been increased because of
changes in the assessment rate,
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2506; Compiler's Notes,
C.L. 1917, §5866; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-5-1;
The 1979 amendment reduced the
L. 1947, ch. 102, § 1; 1961, ch. 142, § 1; 1979, assessment rate from 30% to 25%; and added
ch. 213, § 1; 1981, ch. 231, § 2.
the last sentence.
ARTICI ,E 2
ASSESSMENT BY COUNTY ASSESSOR
Section
59-5-4

(icneral duties of county assessors • Election by taxpayer for assessment of goods
at average value — Assessing interstate carriers.
59-5-4.5. Assessor to recognize certain expenses in valuing property — Percentage limitation
59-5-6. Report of valuation of taxable value of property to municipal ai it.horit.ies
59-5-4. General duties of county assessors — Election by taxpayer for
assessment of goods at average value — Assessing interstate carriers. The
county assessor must, before t-h-e fifteenth day of A-priJ the first day of June of each
year, ascertain the names of all taxable inhabitants and all property in the county
subject to taxation except such as is required to be assessed by the state tax commission and must assess s«eh the property to the person by who.ni, it was owned
or claimed, or in whose possession or control it was, at 12 o'clock m. of the first
day of January next preceding, and at its value on that date; provided that the
owner of any stock, of goods, inventory, or other accumulation of personal property
which may tend to-vary in quantity or value from day to day, may elect to have
sttieh the personal property assessed on, tl ic basis of the average value thereof

6
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The state tax commission \s authorized to incur by agreement up to 50% of the
expense of such services from its own appropriation.
History: L. 1969, ch. 179, §3; 1970, ch. 9,
§2; 1981, ch. 233, § 1.
59-5-109. Real property valuations to be rolled back to 1978 levels. All
locally assessed taxable real property shall be appraised at current fair market
value and the value of such property rolled back to its January 1, 1978, level as
such level is determined by the state tax commission.
History: C. 1953, 59-5409, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 233, § 2.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1981, ch. 233, § 2 repealed old section
59-5-109 (L. 1969, ch. 179, §4; 1979, ch. 211,
§1), relating to revaluation of property, and
enacted new section 59-5-109.
Title of Act.
An act relating to revenue and taxation;
providing for taxable real property
valuations to be rolled back to 1978 levels;
59-5-109.5.

providing that annual studies between the
assessed value and market value of each type
of taxable property within taxing districts be
conducted by the state tax commission.
This act amends section 59-5-108, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by
chapter 9, Laws of Utah 1970; and repeals
and reenacts section 59-5-109, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter
211, Laws of Utah 1979, and section
59-5-109.6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by chapter 224, Laws of Utah 1977.
— Laws 1981, ch. 233.

Repealed.

Repeal.
Section 59-5-109.5 (L. 1977, ch. 216, §1),
relating to revaluational programs additional

to the initial program, was repealed by Laws
1979, ch. 211, §2.

59-5-109.6. Assessment-sales ratio studies authorized — Adjustment or
factoring o£ assessment rates by counties. (1) Each year, to assist it in the
adjustment and equalization of valuation and assessment of taxable real property,
the state tax commission shall conduct and publish the results of studies of the
relationship between the assessed and market values of property to determine
assessment-sales ratios for each type of taxable real property within taxing districts. Assessors may provide sales information.
(2) The state tax commission shall, before December 1 of each even-numbered
year, order each county to adjust or factor its assessment rates using the most
current studies so that the assessment rate in each county is in accordance with
that prescribed in section 59-5-1. Such adjustment or factoring may include an
entire county, geographical areas within a county and separate classes of
properties. The state tax commission shall also order corrective action where significant value deviations occur as indicated by the coefficient of dispersion.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-109.6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 233, § 3.

Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1981, ch. 233, § 3 repealed old section
59-5-109.6 (L. 1977,, ch. 224, §1), relating to
assessment-sales ratio studies, and enacted
new section 59-5-109.6.

59-5-111. Limitation of levies against assessed property values —
Exceptions — Election procedures — "Taxing district" defined. (1) Prior to
the imposition of property tax mill levies against ivew assessed property values
incorporated onto the tax rolls of any county of 10% or more as the result of any
revaluation program conducted pursuant to section 59-5-109 or ajiy adjustments
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ARTICLE 2
I ,\ 11, I ,v ,\ i O M M I S S I O N
Sectioi.

*M'^ t i t

IUI application to annvl tu
cessment — Hearings.
.•ligations by tax commission
— Assessment of escaped

59-7-12. Time for application
Hearings.

-•{•oil} - Increase or de* as»- uf assessed valuation,
u/atnn based on reports of
i'unt\ auditors.
ifSSItiril!

If the owner of any property assessed by the state tax commission or any
county with a showing of reasonable cause o'bjects to the assessment, either
may, before the tenth day of April, apply to the commission for a hearing.
Both the owner or the county upon a showing of reasonable cause shall be
allowed to be a party at any hearing under this section
The tax commission shall set a time for hearing the objection from April
10 until April 22. At the hearing the tax commission may increase, lower or
sustain the assessment, if the commission finds an error in the assessment
or if it is necessary to equalize the assessment with other similarly assessed
property.
,.i
*
* i i i e ^» .
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2563;
v, H
L. 1909, ch. 63, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5926; L. ' - i iU*H in any pair ,tlai, and it shall set 8
1931, ch. 53, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, time for hearing such objections, between the
tenth day of April and the twenty-second day
80-7-12; I , 1982, ch 71, § 41; 1983, ch. 278,
of April, inclusive, and may correct and in§ 1,
crease or lower any assessment made by it, so
Compiler's Notes. - The 1982
us to equalize the same with the assessment
ment substituted "before the tenth —„, ...
if
• ther property in the state."
April" for "between the third Monday in May
and the second Monday in June"; and in- Burden of 'taxpayer.
serted "between the tenth day of April and
In protesting an assessment, taxpayer not
•venty-second day of April, inclusive."
only must show substantial error or impro:*; 1983 amendment rewrote this section priety in the assessment, but also must prowhich read: "If the owner of any property as- vide a sound evidentiary basis upon which
sessed by the state tax commission is dissat- the commission could adopt a lower valuaisfied with the assessment made by it, such tion, Utah Power & Light Co. v Utah S^t
owner may, before the tenth day of April, Ta x Coram, (1979) 590 P 2d 332.

59-7-13. Investigations by tax commission
Assessment " i scaped property — Increase or decrease of assessed valuation.
Each iyi*iji" the State Tax Commission shall conduct an Investigation"
throughout each county of the state to determine whether all property
subject lo taxation is on the assessment rolls, and whether such property is
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R E V E N U E AND TAXATION

History; C. 1953, 59-10-70, e n a c t e d b y L.
1974, ch. 27, § 16.
C o m p i l e r s N o t e s . - Laws 1974, ch. 27,
§ 16 repealed old section 59-10-70 (R.S. 1898
& C.L. 1907, § 2665; C.L. 1917, § 6066; R.S.

1933 & C. 1943, 80-10-73; L. 1969, ch. 206,
§ 30), relating to the county auditor's report
to the state auditor, and enacted new section
59-10-70

CHAPTER 11
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section
59-11-1.
59-11-11.
59-11-12.

Section
Examination of books of county
officers by state officers.
P a y m e n t under protest — Action
to recover.
P a y m e n t under protest — Judg-

ment for recovery — Payment.
59-11-13. Repealed.
59-11-16. Rate of interest.
59-11-17. Date falling on other than work
day.

59-11-1. Examination of books of county officers by
state officers*
The state auditor, as well as any member of the state tax commission, or
any person designated by them, may examine the books of any officer
charged with the collection and receipt of state taxes.
History: R S . 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2670;
C.L. 1917, $ 6080; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
80-11-1; L. 1983, ch. 320, § 3 7 .
Compiler's N o t e s . — The 1983 amend-

ment deleted "of the state board of examiners
or" before "of the state tax commission"; and
m a d e a minor change in punctuation.

59-11-10. Illegal tax or license — Injunction, etc.
Constitutionality of tax.
The constitutionality or legality of the tax
s t a t u t e s may be raised as issues in an action

in a district court p u r s u a n t to this section or
59-11-11. State Tax Comm. v. Wright (1979)
596 P 2d 634.

59-11-11. Payment under protest — Action to recover.
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public revenue
which is deemed unlawful by the party whose property is thus taxed, or
from whom such tax or license is demanded or enforced, such party may
pay under protest such tax or license, or any part thereof deemed unlawful,
to the officers designated and authorized by law to collect the same; and
thereupon the party so paying or his legal representative may bring an
action in the tax division of the appropriate district court against the officer
to whom said tax or license was paid, or against the state, county, municipality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the same was collected, to
recover said tax or license or any portion thereof paid under protest.
134

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, $ 2684;
C.L. 1917, § 6094; R.S. 1933 & C 1943,
80-11-11; L. 1977, ch. 80, 5 3.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1977 amend-

59-11-12

ment substituted "the tax division of t h e appropriate district court** for "any court of
competent jurisdiction."

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of tax.
P a y m e n t under section not necessary.
Sewer connection fee.
Standing.
Constitutionality of tax.
T h e constitutionality or legality of the tax
s t a t u t e s may be raised as issues in an action
in a district court pursuant to this section or
59-11-10. State Tax Comm. v. Wright (1979)
596 P 2d 634.
P a y m e n t u n d e r section not necessary.
Where owners were improperly taxed, it
was not necessary to pay under protest and
be p u t to expense of lawsuit until administrative remedies were exhausted. Baker v. Tax
Comm. (1974) 520 P 2d 203.
S e w e r c o n n e c t i o n fee.
Termination, without hearing, of water
service to city residents who failed to pay ini-

tial sewer connection fee p u r s u a n t to ordinance requiring connection to new sewer system was not a deprivation of property without due process since procedures available to
residents insured notice and opportunity to
be heard. Rupp v. GranUviile City (1980) 610
P 2d 338.
Standing.
Plaintiff had sufficient standing to file
claim where he alleged t h a t property tax
statute was unconstitutional in t h a t it taxed
a limited amount of property, and allowed
expenditure of tax dollars on religious institutions t h a t paid no taxes, t h u s resulting in
his having to pay more in property taxes.
J e n k i n s v. Swan (1983) 675 P 2d 1145.

59-11-12. Payment under protest — Judgment for recovery — Payment.
In case it is determined in any action that a tax or license, or any portion
paid under protest was unlawfully collected, a judgment for recovery and
lawful interest, together with costs of action shall be entered in favor of the
plaintiff. Upon being presented a duly authenticated copy of the judgment,
the proper officer or officers of the state, county or municipality whose
officers collected or received the tax or license shall audit and allow such
judgment, and cause a warrant to be drawn for the amount recovered by
the judgment in favor of the legal holder. When the judgment is obtained
against a county, and any portion of the taxes included in the judgment are
state, district school or other taxing-units taxes which have been or may be
paid over to the state or to any school district or other taxing unit by the
county, the proper officer or officers of the state, school district or other
taxing unit shall, upon demand by the county, cause a warrant to be drawn
upon the treasurer of the state, school district or other taxing unit in favor
of the county, for the amount of the taxes received, together with legal
interest and an equitable portion of the costs of the action.
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59-24-2

TAX COURT ACT

CHAPTER 24
TAX COURT ACT
Section
59-24-1.
59-24-2.

59-24-3.
59-24-4.
59-24-5.

Section
Tax division created in each district court — Jurisdiction —
Probate division not affected.
Appeal from tax commission to tax
division of district court —
Waiver — Review by Supreme
Court.
Appeal from tax commission to tax
division of district court —
Procedure.
Burden of proof — Decision of
court.
Tax division of third judicial dis-

59-24-6.

59-24-7.
59-24-8.
59-24-9.

trict — Publication of decisions.
Tax division of third judicial district — Judge permanently
assigned — Qualifications of
judges.
Decision of tax division of district
court as final determination.
Appeal to Supreme Court from decision or order of tax division
of district court.
District courts outside Salt Lake
County — Service by third judicial district judge.

59-24-1. Tax division created in each district court —
Jurisdiction — Probate division not affected.
(1) There is created a tax division in each of the district courts of the
State of Utah which shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from
and petitions for review of decisions by the state tax commission rendered
after formal hearings before the commission.
(2) The creation of a tax division in each of the district courts of this state
shall not affect the jurisdiction of the probate division of those district
courts to hear and determine matters relating to inheritance tax as conferred by chapter 12 of title 59.
History: C. 1953, 59-24-1, enacted by L.
1977,ch.80,§ 20.

59-24-2. Appeal from tax commission to tax division of
district court — Waiver — Review by Supreme
Court.
(1) Within 30 days after notice of any decision by the state tax commission rendered after a formal hearing before it, any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the
decision may appeal or petition for review to the tax division of the district
court located in the county of residence or principal place of business of the
affected taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a
statewide basis, to the tax division of the third judicial district court in and
for Salt Lake County.
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(2) In all cases, whether or not proper under subsection (1), any aggrieved party appearing before the state tax commission or county whose
tax revenues are affected by the decision may appeal or petition for review
a decision rendered after a formal hearing of the commission to the tax
division of the third judicial district court in and for Salt Lake County
within the specified 30 days following notice of such decision.
(3) In the alternative, a taxpayer may waive review and trial de novo in
the tax division of the district court and, within the specified 30 days following the required notice, may seek review by the Utah Supreme Court
upon writ of certiorari. If a taxpayer or any affected county chooses to
waive right of review by the tax division of the district court and applies for
a writ in the Supreme Court, the taxpayer or affected county must (a) state
in the application for the writ that the taxpayer or affected county is waiving the right of review and trial de novo in the tax division of the district
court and (b) comply with the provisions of sections 59-5-78, 59-13-48,
59-14A-77, 59-15-16 and/or 59-16-13 as though seeking review in the tax
division of the district court. A county whose tax revenues are affected by
the decision being reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the
proceeding before the Supreme Court.
History: C. 1953, 59-24-2, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 80, § 21; L. 1983, ch. 278, § 2.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment inserted "or county whose tax revenues
are affected by the decision" in subsecs. (1)
and (2); inserted "or any affected county" and
"affected county" in the second sentence of
subsec. (3); and added the last sentence in
subsec. (3).
Sections 59-13-48, 59-14A-77, 59-15-16 and
59-16-13, referred to in subsec. (3), were repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 283, § 10.
F

J

Failure to waive right to review in district court.
Failure to expressly waive the right to review in the tax division of the district court
and failure to state such waiver in the application for review by the Supreme Court upon
writ of certiorari is to be treated as a pleadin
S deficiency of the kind to which the
pleader's adversary must make timely object i o n o r t h e r i h t to o b e c t t o t h e e r r o r i n
S
J
P^ding is waived. Salt Lake County v. Tax
Comm. ex rel. Greater Salt Lake Recreational Facilities (1979) 596 P 2d 641.

59-24-3. Appeal from tax commission to tax division of
district court — P r o c e d u r e .
(1) All appeals from and petitions for review of decisions of the state tax
commission brought before the tax division of any district court shall be
original, independent proceedings and shall be tried without jury and de
novo.
(2) If a statute provides for an appeal or review by the tax division of a
district court of an order or determination of the state tax commission or of
any other administrative agency, the proceeding shall be an original proceeding in the nature of a suit in equity to set aside such order or determination. The time within which the statute provides that the proceedings
shall be brought is a period of limitations and not jurisdictional.
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History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 22.
Cross-References.— Archives and Records
Service and Information Practices Act, exemplnry damages under, § 63-2-88.
Health Care Malpractice Act, relation to this
chapter, § 78-14-10.

63-30-23,

vjuuni^ivrvu

Salaries of public officers subject to garnishment, § 78-27-15.
Tax levy for payment of punitive damages
awarded against elected official or employee,
§ 63-30-27.

P a y m e n t of claim or j u d g m e n t against state —
P r e s e n t m e n t for p a y m e n t

Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 63-30-2(1) or any
final judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the state risk
manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for payment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or
claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed
as provided in Section 63-6-10.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 23; 1983, ch.
129, § 9; 1987, ch. 75, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "Subsection 63-30-2(1)" for
"Subsection 63-30-2(5)."

63-30-24. P a y m e n t of claim or j u d g m e n t against political
subdivision — Procedure by governing body.
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of said political subdivision unless said funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law
or contract for other purposes.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 24.

63-30-25.

P a y m e n t of claim or judgment against political
subdivision — Installment p a y m e n t s .

If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current
fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual
installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the
claimant.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 25.

63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purc h a s e of insurance created by political subdivisions.
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund or may
jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions to a
joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of claims against the
co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this chapter,
542
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or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the co-operating
subdivisions from any or all risks created by this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 26; 1983, ch.
129, § 10.

63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of
claims, judgments, or insurance premiums.
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay the following:
(a) any claim;
(b) any settlement;
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an elected official or
employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers, based upon
a claim for punitive damages but the authority of a political subdivision
for the payment of an)r judgment for punitive damages is limited in any
individual case to $10,000;
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated.
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such insurance as authorized is
money spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this section and
Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No levy under this
section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property. The
revenues derived from this levy may not be used for any other purpose than
those stipulated in this section.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 27; 1973, ch.
165, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 8; 1985, ch. 165, § 81;
1988, ch. 3, § 234.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted ".0001" for "one-half mill"
near the end of the section.
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9,
1988, rewrote the section, as amended by Laws

1985, ch. 165, § 81„ to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988,
ch. 3, § 269 provides that the act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1988.
Cross-References. — No judgment for punitive damages to be rendered against governmental entity, § 63-30-22.

63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized
— Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance.
Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its
employee may be held liable.
In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental
entity may self-insure with respect to specified classes of claims by establish543

